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‘Scientists don’t care about truth anymore’: the climate crisis and rejection of 
science in Canada’s oil country
Timothy J. Haney
Department of Sociology & Anthropology, Mount Royal University, Calgary, Canada
ABSTRACT
Recent research in the area of science and technology studies focuses on climate change 
denial, the spread of misinformation, and public distrust in climate scientists; these beliefs are 
held especially by those dependent on fossil fuel extraction for their livelihoods. Many of the 
same individuals who deny the scientific consensus on climate change are nevertheless directly 
impacted by the climate crisis and environmental disasters. In fossil fuel dependent locations, 
do people continue to deny the scientific consensus on climate change and distrust climate 
scientists even after themselves experiencing a catastrophic flood? This paper investigates this 
question through interviews with 40 people affected by the 2013 Southern Alberta Flood, the 
costliest flood in Canadian history, who also live in the City of Calgary, the economic hub for 
Canada’s tar sands. Results indicate the participants rejected the scientific consensus on 
climate change, voiced a distrust in the motivations of climate scientists, though hoped they 
would one day discover the ‘truth’, and worked discursively to protect the oil industry. The 
findings reveal the complexity of post-disaster environmental views and trust in science, as well 
as how fossil fuel dependence shapes these views.
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Introduction
Risks are endemic in North American cities – places 
vulnerable to hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and 
a litany of more mundane hazards, generating renewed 
scholarly interest in the urban hazardscape (Khan, 
Crozier, and Kennedy 2012). Most of these risks are 
being exacerbated and intensified by climate change 
and the current climate crisis. On this matter, there is 
a scientific consensus: The earth’s climate is changing, 
humans are primarily responsible for it via our carbon 
emissions (IPCC 2018, 2015), and that change is intensi-
fying disaster risks worldwide (UNISDR 2019). On that 
latter point, there is largely even agreement between 
scientists (Cook et al. 2016), NGO’s (Red Cross 2020), and 
the private sector (Swiss Re Institute 2019).
Despite the scientific consensus, public opinion lags 
somewhat behind in both Canada and the United 
States, though is gaining ground in the USA. In 
Canada, the province with the highest proportion of 
climate change skeptics and deniers is Alberta which, 
not coincidentally, is home of the tar sands – the third 
largest petroleum deposit in the world. In Alberta, 
production and growth in the tar sands means jobs 
and very high incomes and, as we might expect, 
Albertans rally to protect their oil industry when they 
feel it is threatened (Davidson and Gismondi 2011).
But how do those dependent on oil production for 
their livelihoods make sense of the climate crisis and the 
scientific consensus on it after themselves experiencing 
an environmental disaster? How do they express trust or 
mistrust in scientists and the empirical questions that 
scientists understand as being quite settled? And, in 
what ways do defensiveness about the oil and gas 
industry help us understand their views of climate 
change and the attendant science?
To answer these questions, the present study mobi-
lizes qualitative interview data drawn from 40 resi-
dents of Calgary, Alberta in the neighborhoods 
immediately adjacent to the city’s major rivers, the 
Bow and Elbow. As the rivers attract many of the 
city’s wealthiest denizens, nearby land houses many 
who work in the oil and gas industry or in white-collar 
industries that support or depend upon it. At the same 
time, the city’s two rivers catastrophically flooded in 
2013 (Pomeroy, Stewart, and Whitfield 2016), an event 
that became the costliest disaster in Canadian history, 
and indeed, nearly all participants in the study flooded. 
How did these flood-affected but oil-dependent resi-
dents express agreement/disagreement with the 
scientific consensus, explain their trust or mistrust of 
science and scientists, and understand actions that 
might be taken to limit carbon emissions? Answering 
these question will help us to learn more about the 
complex, nuanced ways that people view scientific 
work on climate change, particularly in communities 
highly dependent on fossil fuels.
As I demonstrate below, participants in this inter-
view study, when questioned about their environmen-
tal views, engaged in four main discursive strategies: A) 
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They expressed disbelief in the scientific consensus on 
climate change; B) They expressed a distrust in scien-
tists, though some did trust scientists to one day prove 
that climate change is not caused by humans; C) They 
defend the oil and gas industry while blaming other 
nations and other fuel sources (i.e., not oil) for climatic 
changes, and D) They suggest solutions for the climate 
crisis that are both at odds with scientific positions 
and, most importantly, are less of a threat to the profit-
ability of Alberta’s oil and gas industry.
Literature review
Research on public understandings of climate change 
most often focuses on the demographics of popula-
tions who accept or deny anthropogenic climate 
change (i.e., McCright and Dunlap 2011a; Spence, 
Poortinga, and Pidgeon 2012; Smiley 2017; McCright 
2010; Hamilton, Hartter, and Bell 2019). Recently, an 
interesting line of work has focused on the role of 
emotions (Norgaard 2011), on silence and avoidance 
(Zerubavel 2006), and on how people work to spin 
worrying information in a positive light (Cerulo 2006). 
Less often has research looked at how people discur-
sively frame their ideas of climate change, and how 
those framings stem from their ultimate trust or dis-
trust of the work of scientists. At the same time, a body 
of existing literature demonstrates how dependence 
on fossil fuels affects beliefs about climate change. 
First, however, I will briefly outline the scientific con-
sensus on climate change.
The scientific consensus
As most readers will be aware, the scientific consensus 
is that the Earth’s climate is changing and becoming 
more volatile, and that human activity is primarily 
responsible for it. Recent research demonstrates that 
about 97 or 98% of climate scientists subscribe to 
views consistent with this anthropogenic climate 
change (Anderegg et al. 2010; Cook et al. 2016). 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC 2018) ‘human influence has become 
a principal agent of change on the planet, shifting 
the world out of the relatively stable Holocene period 
into a new geological era, often termed the 
Anthropocene’ (p. 53). This consensus is that ‘human 
activities are estimated to have caused approximately 
1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels . . . . 
Likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2050’ (p. 4). 
Along with the changes to the climate, disasters and 
catastrophes are becoming more common and 
damages from them are increasing (UNISDR 2019). 
Even 15 years ago, no major scientific organization 
took the position that humans are not changing the 
earth’s climate (Oreskes 2004), a view that remains the 
consensus today (NASA 2021). The world’s scientists 
have argued we have a worsening climate emergency 
in need of drastic and immediate action (reductions in 
emissions), citing their own moral obligation to speak 
out (Ripple et al. 2020).
Despite these urgent matters of fact, there remains 
public skepticism and outright denial. In the United 
States research indicates that as of 2015, just over 
half the population acknowledged that climate change 
is occurring and is caused mainly by human activity, 
while 30 to 40% conceded that the climate is changing 
but believe its causes are mainly natural (Hamilton 
et al. 2015). The percentage accepting the scientific 
consensus rose by about 10 points between 2010 
and 2016, however (Hamilton 2016), and indeed 81% 
of Americans now attribute climate change at least 
somewhat to human activity (Goldberg et al. 2020) 
while a full two-thirds of Americans now think the US 
government should take action to address climate 
change (Tyson and Kennedy 2020). These findings 
generally track patterns in climate change denial 
from other wealthy countries/regions like Australia 
(Tranter 2017), New Zealand (Milfont, Wilson, and 
Sibley 2017) and Europe (Poortinga et al. 2019). In 
this body of work, different views of climate change 
are often aligned with political views, with conserva-
tives/Republicans more likely to reject the consensus 
(Hamilton, Hartter, and Bell 2019; McCright and Dunlap 
2011a, McCright and Dunlap 2011b). In Canada, the 
vast majority of people (83%) believe that the earth is 
getting warmer, and 60% acknowledge that it is warm-
ing mostly or partly because of human activity, how-
ever these numbers are precipitously lower in Alberta, 
where only 70% believe the earth is warming and 42% 
believe that warming is caused by humans 
(Mildenberger et al. 2016). In other words, fewer than 
half of Albertans subscribe to the scientific consensus 
on anthropogenic climate change. Along similar lines, 
only 34% of Albertans believe that climate change will 
harm them personally, and only 56% believe that their 
province has already felt the effects of climate change. 
Alberta, the site of the current study, leads the nation 
in climate change denial. Why might that be? As the 
follow section teaches us, communities reliant on fossil 
fuel extraction are particularly prone to this sort of 
denial. First, however, it is also important to note that 
disasters also play a role in shifting climate change 
beliefs and environmental concern, as first-hand 
experience of disaster and/or extreme weather events 
has been found to alter such views, often in the direc-
tion of greater acceptance of the scientific consensus 
and greater environmental concern (Sarathchandra 
and Haltinner 2020; Hamilton, Safford, and Ulrich 
2012; Cutler 2016; Tanner and Árvai 2018; Tidball 
2012; Kato, Passidomo, and Harvey 2014). This debate 
is far from settled, however, and it should be noted 
that this is not the case during and after all crises 
(Hamilton et al. 2016), and that these perspectival 
2 T. J. HANEY
changes do not necessarily translate into actions or 
pro-environmental behaviors (Dessai and Sims 2010), 
owing to a disconnect between actions undertaken 
and severe impacts of climate change, which may 
happen far away from the highest-contributing com-
munities (Zahran et al. 2008).
Fossil fuel communities and climate change beliefs
A body of work in sociology and related fields shows us 
how fossil fuel extraction communities are shaped 
politically, socially, and culturally by their economic 
dependence on those resources (Bell 2016; Malin 
2015; Bell and York 2010; Truong, Davidson, and 
Parkins 2019; Eaton and Kinchy 2016). Residents of 
communities dependent on fossil fuel extraction har-
bor environmental views at odds with scientific evi-
dence and may police one another’s views, public 
speech, and activism. But a particularly useful body of 
work shows us how these beliefs and views change, 
particularly during and after environmental crises.
For instance, Bishop (2014) finds that after the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, residence in counties 
highly dependent upon offshore drilling was predic-
tive of pro-drilling attitudes after the disaster, even 
more so than before the disaster. In other words, the 
disaster prompted people in these dependent coun-
ties to circle the wagons to protect their economic 
interests after an event that Bishop calls a ‘focusing 
event.’ These events can give rise to such protective 
behaviors out of concern that the industry might be 
threatened (for instance, by a moratorium on offshore 
drilling). Along similar lines, Hamilton, Safford, and 
Ulrich (2012) find that following the same event, 
those in states dependent on tourism (Florida) were 
more likely to support restrictions on offshore drilling, 
and more likely to embrace environmentalism, than 
those in states more dependent on oil (Louisiana). In 
both cases, residents’ views were shaped by their eco-
nomic interests and whether oil threatened their lar-
gest industry (Florida) or was their largest industry 
(Louisiana).
In many fossil fuel dependent communities, of 
course, a substantial share of the population works 
directly in the industry. How does that work exert an 
influence on their environmental views and their posi-
tion on climate change? Lefsrud and Meyer (2012) 
conducted a survey of more than 1,000 engineers 
and geoscientists in Alberta, and they find that 
a substantial portion of these educated professionals 
(24%) believe that ‘changes to the climate are natural, 
normal cycles of the earth,’ sometimes even viewing 
these changes as wholly positive. Another 10% felt that 
the ‘real’ cause of climate change is yet unknown, and 
in doing so, they pointed out the economic harm they 
felt would be done through emissions reductions. 
Another group, comprising 17%, felt fatalistically 
about it, and did not believe actions would have any 
effect anyway. In all, about half of the professional 
engineers and geologists, in some way or another, 
doubted the scientific consensus on climate change. 
In doing so, they frequently referred to their own 
shrewd abilities as experts to sort out truth from false-
hoods, maintaining confidence in their judgement. 
Even more worrisome, those higher up in their organi-
zations’ hierarchies, thus wielding more decision- 
making power, were the least likely to voice views 
supportive of the scientific consensus and to support 
regulation.
In these fossil fuel dependent communities, it can 
be difficult to speak about the environment and about 
climate change. Residents fear ostracization and exclu-
sion (Evans and Garvin 2009; Davidson 2018) as the 
larger fossil-fuel dependent community refuses to tol-
erate dissent or opposing views, though speaking out 
against the hegemony of fossil fuels is often under-
taken by women (Bell 2013; Bell and Braun 2010) and 
by children (McDonald-Harker, Bassi, and Haney 2021), 
those most negatively affected by the industry and 
with fewer direct economic ties to the industry.
There’s a nascent body of work from Alberta looking 
at how fossil fuel dependence shapes post-disaster 
environmental views, as well. Haney and McDonald- 
Harker (2017) show how flood-affected adults began to 
think about and care about environmental change and 
risks since the 2013 flood. At the same time, Milnes and 
Haney (2017) show how fossil fuel dependence 
explains men’s post-disaster environmental compla-
cency, and they find that women are more likely to 
embrace environmentalism after disaster. The ways 
dependence manifests in environmental views is 
made evident by McDonald-Harker, Bassi, and Haney 
(2021), who studied disaster-affected children in 
Alberta. Despite living in a community where many 
people are dependent on fossil fuels, children (even 
many whose parents worked in oil) spoke emotionally 
and persuasively about the climate crisis and the need 
to mitigate it. This literature highlights how many liv-
ing in Southern Alberta following the 2013 flood did 
indeed adapt their environmental views and practices, 
as a direct result of their experiences in the flood 
(Haney 2021), though we understand less about their 
post-disaster views on science, scientists, and the con-
sensus on climate change.
Distrust of science
Scholars have recently noted that public distrust of 
science is becoming a prevalent and more alarming 
phenomenon (Gauchat 2012). Research indicates that 
the public is more trusting of scientists who are pub-
licly, not privately, funded (Critchley 2008) and that 
members of the public trust scientists more when 
they consume less conservative media (Hmielowski 
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et al. 2014). Quantitatively, other important predictors 
of trust are geographic location, religious identification 
(Krause et al. 2019), maintaining an interest in science 
over the life-course (Motta 2018), and subscribing to 
left-wing or progressive politics (Leiserowitz et al. 
2013). Among conservatives, these feelings of trust 
are particularly complicated, with people placing 
trust in science, but distrusting the scientists them-
selves, who they see as having an ideological agenda 
(Mann and Schleifer 2020). Even when scientists warn 
residents of hazards and their attendant risks, the pub-
lic frequently rejects official and scientific narratives 
about those environmental risks (Messer, Shriver, and 
Adams 2017). Messer at al. (2017) find that people 
often challenge the science and data, voicing suspicion 
of the motivations of scientists and government offi-
cials. This suspicion was heightened by the 2009 ‘cli-
mategate’ scandal, in which emails from climate 
scientists purportedly admitted to concealing 
a decline in global temperatures, gained significant 
media coverage (Leiserowitz et al. 2013; Raman and 
Pearce 2020).
Given existing distrust in science, discussed above, 
it might be tempting to argue that reason and ‘truth’ 
do not matter to the public anymore. Yet as Jasanoff 
and Simmet (2017) contend, debates about facts are 
ultimately debates infused with social meanings and 
subjectively experienced, but also rooted in material 
realties. According to them, assuming that we are in 
a post-truth age is naïve because it ‘overlooks people’s 
manifest respect for evidence that matters to their 
condition’ (p. 752); respect in scientific knowledge, in 
other words, is socially patterned and depends upon 
both who created it and how accepting it might affect 
people’s material well-being. Similarly, Boulianne and 
Belland (2019) show that even in Alberta, scientists are 
the most trusted source of information about climate, 
more so than the media. Nevertheless, they conclude 
that ‘scientists’ messages about climate change are 
clouded by high levels of distrust in the news media, 
the primary venue through which their messages are 
conveyed.’ One disconnect occurs because the media 
do not normally connect locally-experienced disasters, 
like wildfires, to climate change, thereby impeding 
Albertans from connecting locally-experienced events 
to climate change (Davidson, Fisher, and Blue 2019). At 
the same time, Albertan and Canadian media outlets in 
have discursively framed the environment/energy 
debate as consisting of two delimited and mutually 
exclusive camps, contributing to polarization of the 
Alberta public (Davidsen 2016).
Distrust of science and scientists in Canada, like in 
the United States, is fueled by a network of corporate- 
funded right-wing think tanks which work to influence 
public beliefs and opinion (Dunlap and Jacques 2013; 
Gutstein 2018; Bonds 2016). These think tanks are also 
deeply embedded within the state in ways that shape 
public policy. Taft (2017) calls this ‘oil’s deep state,’ and 
demonstrates how these parties have worked to influ-
ence governments, to the extent that both right-wing 
and left-wing politicians in Alberta are consistently 
pro-oil, leaving little room in the public sphere for 
dissent. Messaging from think tanks feeds into wide-
spread belief in conspiracy theories in Alberta – a strain 
of thought originating in right-wing populist political 
movements dating back to the 1930’s which situated 
Albertans as victims of various federal and global con-
spiracies (Shamchuk 2012). In the United States, those 
believing in a global climate conspiracy make up 
a sizable minority of climate change deniers, and this 
group is disproportionately composed of higher- 
earning, right-wing, religious, educated older men 
(Sarathchandra and Haltinner 2020). As 
Lewandowsky, Oberauer, and Gignac (2013) find, con-
spiratorial beliefs tend to coalesce as those who 
believe in one conspiracy theory also tend to believe 
in others. Further, they find that endorsement of free- 
market economics (a common position in Alberta, as 
I discuss below) is predictive of climate change denial. 
Though scientists are not normally the main party 
implicated in such conspiracy theory beliefs, those 
who hold such beliefs nevertheless do hold 
a measurable distrust in science (Drummond and 
Fischhoff 2017; Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer 
2013), even relative to other types of climate deniers 
(Sarathchandra and Haltinner 2020).
Potentially most concerning is that despite scien-
tists’ dire warnings about climate change, and the 
need to drastically reduce carbon emissions, many 
Albertans do not see it that way. As Oreskes (2019) 
points out, though scientists may separate empirical 
truths from their implications, the public does not; to 
many members of the public, scientific findings with 
inconvenient implications are to be resisted. Results 
from the province-wide Alberta Climate Dialogues 
reveal that Albertans approach climate change as 
mostly a tame problem ‘that can be solved by techno-
logical solutions or market-based mechanisms that 
keep broader political and economic systems in 
place’ (Blue 2018, p. 138). Thus, Albertans see climate 
change not as a crisis and not as a risk requiring urgent 
mitigative action.
Setting
Alberta is the fourth most populous province in 
Canada, with a population of 4.37 million residents 
(Government of Alberta 2021). Approximately one- 
third of Albertans live in the City of Calgary (population 
1.54 million), one-third in the City of Edmonton (popu-
lation 1.47 million), and the balance (1.36 million) in 
the remainder of the province, often in smaller cities 
and towns (Statistics Canada 2021). Politically speak-
ing, the City of Edmonton is known as being slightly 
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more progressive (though the term ‘liberal’ is rarely 
used in Alberta politics) than the rest of the province, 
and the rural population is decidedly more conserva-
tive, leaving the City of Calgary somewhere in the 
middle (Ward 2019; Cournoyer 2020), though still 
quite far right-leaning by Canadian political standards 
(see Bratt et al. 2019).
Given those political dimensions, Calgary, and 
Alberta more broadly, presents a useful setting for 
the exploration of the rejection of scientific knowl-
edge. Although skepticism about climate change in 
Alberta has been well documented (see above), it 
should also be noted that Alberta has some of the 
worst routine vaccination coverage numbers in 
Canada (Busby and Chesterley 2015), and the highest 
hesitancy among Canadians for the COVID-19 vaccine 
(CBC News 2021). As a result, Alberta has dealt with 
outbreaks of preventable diseases such as pertussis 
and measles, and today 43% of two-year-olds in 
Alberta are unimmunized (Vandenberg and Kulig 
2015). One of the drivers of both climate denial and 
vaccine rejection in Alberta is the education system, 
whereby matters of health and values are barred from 
schools and taught by parents in the home (French 
2016). Alberta also has the lowest rate of post- 
secondary (college and university) attendance and 
completion in the country (COPPA 2019), rendering 
many disconnected from scientific knowledge.
A key driver of skepticism is the public’s tendency to 
believe conspiracy theories, a tendency that has been 
quantitatively linked to refusal to follow public health 
guidelines and to refuse vaccines (Teovanović et al. 
2020). A variety of polls suggest that Albertans are 
more likely than other Canadians to be skeptical of 
climate change, they believe that the federal govern-
ment dedicates too much attention to climate change, 
and believe Canada is already doing more than the rest 
of the world to deal with climate change (Salomons 
and Parkins 2018, p. 90). At the same time, the region is 
highly disaster-prone, with 12 of the 20 costliest dis-
asters in Canadian history occurring in Alberta, includ-
ing six of them in the City of Calgary alone – nearly all 
of them in the past decade (Sauchyn, Davidson, and 
Johnston 2020). This region is ground zero for 
a changing and more chaotic climate, but stubbornly 
questions the attendant science.
Alberta also maintains a political-economic zeitgeist 
that makes it particularly prone to the rejection of 
science and empirical evidence about environmental 
change. Alberta is known as the most conservative of 
Canadian provinces, and its history celebrates the 
rugged individualism embodied by iconic self-made 
oil-men, cowboys, and ranchers – a history still cele-
brated annually at the city’s Calgary Stampede, the 
largest rodeo on earth (Williams 2021). This history 
makes Alberta particularly prone to right-wing popu-
lism (Davidson 2019; Sayers and Stewart 2019).
At the same time, Alberta is home to the tar sands, 
the third largest oil deposit in the world. Despite its 
size, most of the oil is contained as a tarry substance 
called bitumen, which must be mined, then upgraded 
(which is both energy and water-intensive), then piped 
more than 1,000 miles to refineries on the US Gulf 
Coast or Midwest. The polluted water produced as 
a by-product is often stored in large tailings ponds. 
Though oil companies boast about reclaiming and re- 
naturing mined areas, only about 10% of mined tar- 
sands land has undergone this process (Kent 2017). 
The rest remains scars upon the landscape. At the 
same time, toxins from the tar sands contaminate the 
ground and soil, potentially sickening both nearby 
indigenous communities (Alberta Cancer Board 2009) 
and most certainly contaminating wildlife (Cruz- 
Martinez et al. 2015) and water (Kelly et al. 2010). In 
short, the environmental impact of the tar stands is 
substantial. Yet Alberta and Canada both depend upon 
those resources economically, with the energy sector 
currently comprising 23% of Alberta’s GDP and over 
75% of its exports (Salomons and Parkins 2018).
As evidenced in the empirical work discussed above 
(Haney 2021; Haney and McDonald-Harker 2017; 
McDonald-Harker, Bassi, and Haney 2021), the 2013 
Southern Alberta Flood left many people wondering 
what they did not know about environmental pro-
blems and climate change – a finding consistent with 
research in other geographic contexts demonstrating 
how first-hand experience of negative environmental 
events decreases things like conspiracy ideation 
among climate change skeptics (Sarathchandra and 
Haltinner 2020). The flood exposed gaps in their 
knowledge and changed their views. This is particularly 
relevant given the misinformation campaigns aimed at 
Albertans, often undertaken by industry-supported 
think tanks such as ‘Friends of Science’ who boast on 
Calgary billboards that ‘The sun is the main driver of 
climate change. Not you. Not CO2,’ as well as ‘Global 
warming stopped naturally 16+ years ago.’ Discourses 
like these have come to dominate in Alberta, much like 
how the coal industry actively works to shape public 
opinion about the environmental impact of their 
industry (Bell 2016; Mix and Waldo 2015). This came 
to a head in 2015 when Ecojustice filed a complaint 
with the federal Competition Bureau asking it to inves-
tigate false and misleading claims by a number of 
right-wing organizations including Friends of Science, 
the International Climate Science Coalition, and the 
Heartland Institute (Hanson and Kahane 2018, p. 11). 
The emergent denial and misinformation trickle down 
from government, as well; during the catastrophic 
flooding in Calgary and the surrounding areas, the 
Premier of Alberta, Allison Redford, ‘promised to report 
to party members the following week on her recent 
successful trip to New York City to promote the 
Keystone XL pipeline,’ suggesting that ‘her 
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government did not see any obvious link between 
growing greenhouse gas emissions and the growing 
intensity of extreme weather events that ultimately 
caused the very catastrophe she was commenting 
upon’ (Sandford and Freek 2014, p. 48). Given the 
ubiquitous and repetitive pro-oil messaging Albertans 
are exposed to, it creates an economic and social con-
text whereby those who oppose oil and gas infrastruc-
ture are dubbed ‘radicals’ with an ‘ideological agenda’ 
(Salomons and Parkins 2018). As one might expect, 
Salomons and Parkins (2018) conclude that ‘this poli-
tical culture does not lend itself to significant action on 
climate change, especially if such action would poten-
tially threaten the oil sands as the economic engine of 
the province’ (p. 89). Yet outside of activities that the 
state has declared ‘radical’ activism, Carter (2020) 
argues that options for public consultation and feed-
back into oil-related environmental issues is almost 
entirely absent.
Data & methods
The analyses that follow are based upon data derived 
from 40 in-depth interviews with residents of Calgary 
who were affected by the 2013 flood. Interviews took 
place in the Fall of 2015, two years after the flood. 
Recruitment of these 40 participants occurred through 
the community associations in the city’s 26 flood- 
affected neighborhoods. Like many Canadian cities, 
Calgary maintains a very civically active network of 
community associations, which correspond to the 
city’s many neighborhoods (City of Calgary 2018). 
This recruitment followed a 2014 survey of several 
hundred residents in these neighborhoods in which 
community associations were key partners. Our para-
meters included only that the participants be ‘flood 
affected,’ though we left that up to their interpretation. 
In the end, however, 39 out of the 40 participants had 
residences that flooded during the 2013 Southern 
Alberta Flood. In many ways, this recruitment is ideal 
as those who recently experienced an environmental 
disaster have been shown to exhibit changing envir-
onmental views (Haney 2021; Hamilton, Safford, and 
Ulrich 2012; Haney and McDonald-Harker 2017), and 
disaster-affected people might potentially be increas-
ingly likely to accept the scientific consensus on cli-
mate change, having just gone through such an event. 
Twenty of these interviews were with participants who 
identified as being men, and 20 identified as women. 
Thirty-five of the 40 participants provided their age 
(i.e., five missing), resulting in a mean age of 52, and 
a median of 55.5, which is slightly higher than, but in 
the same ballpark as, systematic surveys from Calgary’s 
flood affected neighborhoods (i.e., Haney 2019 who 
found a mean of 48). About one-third of participants 
(n=13) currently worked in the oil and gas industry, in 
roles such as engineering, risk management, finance, 
or geology. Another third (n=14) did not work directly 
in the oil industry but mentioned a close family mem-
ber (usually a spouse) who did or reported being 
retired from the oil industry. And, finally the remaining 
third (n=13) worked in non-oil occupations such as 
teachers, plumbers, technology entrepreneurs, profes-
sors, hairstylists, or were retired from these non-oil 
occupations.
The interviews lasted between one hour and three 
hours, with an average of 1.5 hours, and normally took 
place at a coffee shop or café in the participant’s 
neighborhood, or in a dedicated space at the univer-
sity. To thank participants, we offered them a $50 gift 
card to RONA, a Canadian home improvement store. 
Interview recordings were then transcribed verbatim 
by a third-party transcriptionist, based in Calgary.
We did not ask questions specifically about partici-
pants’ views on science or scientists. Instead, we asked 
broadly about their environmental views, and we 
asked about what actions should be taken to mitigate 
or adapt to climatic changes (taking anthropogenic 
climate change itself as a given). Nevertheless, many 
participants spoke at length about these issues, and 
the topic of this paper arose in a grounded theory 
fashion, from the data themselves. First, the author 
open-coded the data to determine relevant themes. 
Then, both the author and a research assistant inde-
pendently coded the data in NVivo to ensure inter- 
coder reliability (see Warren and Karner 2010). The 
study was approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Board at Mount Royal University. All participant 
names are changed to pseudonyms to ensure 
confidentiality.
Findings
As discussed above, climate scientists almost uniformly 
contend that the earth’s climate is changing and that 
this change is primarily caused by human activity (IPCC 
2018), while recently making calls about the urgency of 
addressing the climate emergency (Ripple et al. 2020) 
and the risks of facing an increasingly volatile climate 
and ever-more climate disasters (UNISDR 2019). Did 
flood-affected participants living in the financial hub 
of Canada’s tar sands subscribe to these same beliefs? 
In short, no. Findings from the study indicate that 
some flood-affected participants from Calgary 
admitted to lacking knowledge about climate change 
and the environment. More often, though, they gave 
voice to positions that are at odds with the scientific 
consensus on climate change. Does distrust of science 
and scientists explain these views that depart from the 
scientific consensus? Yes, although the answer is 
nuanced. Participants espoused a distrust of scientists 
and their motivations to reveal and communicate 
‘truth’ about climate change, though to add a layer of 
complexity, I also find that many participants trusted 
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science insofar as they hoped scientists would one day 
discover the ‘truth’ that climate change either is not 
occurring or is not anthropogenic. Because they 
viewed the science as yet largely unsettled, or because 
they flatly denied the salience of human contributions 
to climate change, many participants discussed their 
reluctance to act too quickly on climate change, and 
only wished to make incremental cuts to emissions, so 
as to not disturb economic growth, demonstrating 
some of the connections between scientific mistrust 
and defensiveness about oil and gas. The sections that 
follow unpack and examine these major themes.
Denial of the scientific consensus
When asked about climate change and the environ-
ment, a few of the participants admitted freely that 
they lacked knowledge on the topic – including par-
ticipants who work in the oil and gas industry them-
selves. Several others contended that the science was 
still unsettled, and felt scientists were working on the 
issue. William tells us ‘There appears to be an increase 
in natural disasters, and whether that is just because 
the media is doing that or if there is a greater number 
of them happening, you know, a lot of times it is hard 
to tell. It appears that there are more and more major 
environmental disasters happening weather-wise and 
I guess whether it is climate change that is doing that 
or is just part of an overall pattern is for the scientists 
to try and figure it out, I guess.’ Though this comment 
by William implies trust in scientists, it also conveys 
that the truth about climate change is yet to be 
discovered.
Much more often than admitting to knowledge 
gaps, however, participants in the study confidently 
espoused theories about anthropogenic climate 
change and its drivers, many of which are not con-
sistent with the scientific consensus on climate 
change reviewed above. Participants took four dis-
cursive approaches for explaining their views on 
climate, which collectively demonstrate they dis-
agreed with the scientific consensus on climate 
change.
First, participants expressed doubt that the 
Earth’s climate is changing. According to Frank, 
scientific thought on whether the earth is cooling 
or warming has ‘flip flopped over the years.’ He 
posits ‘how much of it is our fault and how much 
of it is just the earth going through cycles is kind 
of a crap shoot . . . We definitely have put a lot of 
pollution in the air but not as much as a mega- 
volcano probably.’ Jackie, who works directly in the 
oil and gas industry, discusses disasters, saying
“sometimes I wonder if they are more common, but 
not necessarily Calgary but sort of worldwide, but 
I think, like many things in life are cyclical . . . . I think 
Mother Nature has . . . the earth has a balance when it 
comes to the climate, and so I think it is almost sort of 
a finite resource . . . .I don’t think they are necessarily 
more common, but I think we are hearing about them 
more often because of social media now.”
She later concludes, ‘The majority is just a natural pro-
cess . . . . The dinosaurs didn’t drive cars and all that 
kind of stuff and they still went extinct!’ The partici-
pants were especially careful about how they dis-
cussed responsibility for climate change. We asked 
them directly what they thought the main drivers of 
climate change were, and many like Caleb, answered 
‘Well global warming [is] due to the greenhouse gases. 
I mean that is what we are hearing so that is what 
I would have to agree with, I guess.’ But he then back-
tracks and says that much of it is due to ‘natural cycles.’ 
Some, in fact, had trouble even discussing climate 
change without shifting the topic (see also Norgaard 
2011). Graham, when asked about climate change, 
immediately shifted (as did many participants) to the 
issue of ‘pollution’ but then took this one step further, 
insisting ‘Pollution is a human problem – any pollu-
tion – and so I think there is verbal pollution, you know, 
somebody starts in here and starts ranting with foul 
language – that is pollution. All sorts of things. You 
could wear perfume that could pollute my air.’ 
Graham, like many participants, reduced carbon emis-
sions to the notion of ‘pollution,’ and in doing so, 
avoided discussing human contributions to climate 
change via fossil fuel use.
Second, participants in the study gave information 
about the causes and drivers of climate change at 
odds with the consensus position of scientists, and 
only very rarely attributed climate change to 
humans’ carbon emissions. In doing so, they echoed 
positions consistent with industry messaging and 
with Alberta’s climate change-denying think tanks 
(Heald 2017; McCartney and Gray 2018; Plait 2014). 
When asked about the role of carbon emissions 
directly, they often expressed skepticism. Kristopher 
says, ‘in terms [of], is it caused by CO2? Maybe, but 
the data is very – I mean that gets very complicated 
very quickly and very messy and I’ll tell you it’s not 
at all clear to me that [CO2] is a direct cause.’ And 
even those Calgarians who accept that climate 
change is anthropogenic nevertheless shift blame 
away from fossil fuels onto other sources. Rachel, 
when asked about leading drivers of climate change 
said she didn’t know, but ‘I guess it’s CO2.’ When 
prompted about fossil fuels she said ‘Does that 
include cow farts? (laughing) ‘Cause I think cow 
farts are bad too . . . . I don’t know. I’m honestly 
not educated. It doesn’t really matter. Whatever the 
truth is. Whatever the scientific truth is. I’ll go with 
that. I don’t want to sit here and go ‘No, it’s . . . . 
Jesus! like what do I know?’ In her discussion, she 
both admits to ignorance, but also mentions ‘cow 
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farts’ (methane from animal agriculture – which is 
certainly a source of carbon pollution), not discussing 
the role of fossil fuels.
Many of the participants instead felt that climate 
change is a natural and incorrigible process. As Derek 
tells us, ‘climate change is a mostly natural process that 
we have very little control over.’ Upon further prompt-
ing, he said that he believes the sun and solar radiation 
are the largest drivers of climate change, a message 
consistent with the Calgary climate-change-denying 
think tank named ‘Friends of Science’ who contends 
on billboards that ‘The sun is the main driver of climate 
change. Not you, not CO2’ (Plait 2014). Many others 
echoed these feelings that control of our climate 
comes from outside our atmosphere. Bradley adds, ‘I 
think there’s a natural phenomenon happening. 
There’s something – a major cycle that we go through. 
I mean the earth changes on its axis. . . . We can’t 
forecast the weather from any more than three days 
ahead . . . . And so I don’t think we know enough yet.’ 
Inherent in that statement, of course, is the notion that 
climate change scientists cannot be sure yet because 
more must be learned. Feelings like this were over-
whelmingly common in the data (particularly, but not 
exclusively, from men). Derek, an oil and gas geologist 
says ‘Climate [is] always changing. So I’d say probably 
the sun. Radiation’s the biggest change to climate. 
Sunspot activity.’ Later in the interview, when asked 
about what needs to be done to prevent climate 
change, he adds ‘Nothing.’ And says ‘we have very 
little control over [it]. I don’t think carbon dioxide is 
a driving force of climate change,’ a position he shares 
with many of Alberta’s geoscientists (Lefsrud and 
Meyer 2012). Again, when asked about programs that 
could be adopted to mitigate climate change, he only 
laughed and did not respond. He finished the environ-
mental section of the interview by saying ‘You’re going 
to think I’m a nutbar’ – perhaps recognizing that his 
position runs counter to the scientific consensus. Dave, 
a 62-year-old man from the flooded Douglasdale area 
of Calgary, who works in risk management for an oil 
and gas company, when asked about the drivers of 
climate change, said that ‘Forest fires is probably one 
of the biggest ones. A lot of it is natural.’ Later in the 
interview, he discusses volcanic eruptions as a major 
driver of climate change, as well.
Along those same lines, some participants felt 
that the Earth was actually cooling, not warming. 
Jackie feels this way, telling us ‘I don’t think we 
have time to stop it in a hundred years, but these 
are longer cycles with the Earth. Maybe even in 
a couple of thousand years will it change? We will 
have an ice age in a thousand years, or maybe we 
will be living in a Sahara Desert type place – I don’t 
know. I think it will. We will cycle through.’ Despite 
scientific evidence for the increasing rapidity of cli-
matic shifts (Brito-Morales et al. 2020), Jackie argues 
that these are ‘longer term cycles.’ Wayne felt that 
climate change comes from tectonic shifts, what he 
calls ‘continents moving’ and ‘the cracks filling up 
with water,’ but also potentially ‘the poles have 
moved a little bit’ since ‘Texas is getting a little bit 
of snow now’ (implying cooling, not warming). Frank 
attributes change to volcanic activity, not carbon 
emissions, adding ‘Like I say, one big volcano is 
going to make far more climate change difference 
than we would produce in a year or two years.’
To shift the blame from oil and gas, and carbon 
emissions more generally, several participants 
engaged in discursive work to revise history. Gary is 
an example of this revisionist history, as he says ‘I think 
90% of it – 98% of it – is the natural earth changing. 
Right here [Calgary] there used to be 3,000 feet of ice – 
right here – but it has been going away for thousands 
of years in different areas. Greenland used to be green! 
Really! That is why it is called Greenland!’ Though 
historians do not concur with that account (Nuttall 
2009), this appeal to the historical record gives insight 
into how people construct internally consistent expla-
natory frameworks for their denial of scientific 
evidence.
Third, a very consistent finding in the data is that 
humans do not and cannot have enough power to 
influence these larger climate and cosmic patterns at 
play. Commonly, they call it ‘arrogant’ to believe that 
humans are capable of that. One example is Nancy, 
who works in the oil industry and believes climate 
change is a ‘natural processes. Why do you think we 
have oil here? Well because we’ve been though some 
form of climatic climate change that happened how-
ever many billions of years ago . . . . It’s all a cycle . . . . So 
I think that we are far too arrogant with our “Oh! We’re 
causing all of this – we’re causing all of this!”’ She later 
adds ‘I don’t think we have as much control of the 
environment as we think we do. Us arrogant human 
beings. Things change, and it’s not necessarily cause of 
what we are doing.’ She was not alone in her attribu-
tion of arrogance, with Graham adding ‘I don’t think 
we are going to get control of this world . . . . I think 
that is arrogant. Do I believe humans can greatly harm 
and therefore having created the harm, then reverse it 
and cause good? Yeah absolutely.’ This attribution of 
arrogance by climate scientists (and the members of 
the public who accept the consensus) is consistent 
with messaging from ‘Friends of Science,’ who wrote 
as recently as March 2021 that ‘Model-based predic-
tions of global warming continue to be wrong, only 
proving an overabundance of arrogant confidence by 
their proponents’ (emphasis added) (Friends of Science 
2021).
Graham also responds in an exasperated fashion 
when asked how climate change may affect him per-
sonally, exclaiming ‘I have no idea! I don’t know! This is 
too much . . . So if I was to criticize this, there is too 
8 T. J. HANEY
much work! . . . . So if a person said exhaust from gas 
burning cars is not good for us, I get that. To say it is 
climate change is too big for me . . . But to lump it all 
together and say climate change, that is the flag we are 
going to wave? Well I just think that is ranting. It is 
not . . . it is not problem solving . . . . I think the whole 
concept is a red herring.’ Bradley agrees that humans 
have little control, arguing that climate is a much larger 
geologic phenomenon, ‘When it comes to the environ-
mental impact, we’re not gonna change the axis that 
we rotate on. We’re not gonna change when the sun 
comes up and when it goes down . . . Bottom line is 
I don’t think we can do anything to change the actual 
happenings. I think we just have to adapt.’
Fourth, participants shifted blame about who is 
most responsible for climate change, either onto 
other fuel sources than oil or onto other countries 
than Canada. Peter, a 39-year-old man from 
Sunnyside, when asked what he considers the most 
important driver of climate change responded with 
a one-word answer: ‘China.’ Upon prompting, he said 
‘Because of big contributors like China and India, until 
you get those things under control it’s gonna keep 
happening, it’s going to keep going like it’s going’ 
although he does also add that ‘You know I don’t 
know enough about it to, to make an inform . . . . 
I just sound like an idiot on your . . . I guess I’m not 
informed enough, I guess, to make a statement on it.’
Dave, the 60-year-old risk management officer for 
an oil and gas company, though he felt that climate 
change was ‘mostly natural,’ only minutes later shifted 
the blame to countries with emerging economies. 
According to him ‘I find that the environmentalists 
attack people that are doing the best job. You know, 
I mean our power plants here in Canada are probably 
some of the most efficient ones around. You go to 
China and I mean . . . they’re building one coal-fired 
power plant a day in China, right?’ During this part of 
the interview, he acknowledges that humans are ‘prob-
ably a good part of it [driving climate change],’ but 
does not believe it is Canadians nor Americans – 
despite the fact that North Americans have some of 
the largest per capita carbon footprints on Earth 
(Solarin 2019). The interviews were replete with 
instances of blaming China, India, and Russia, in parti-
cular. Gary argues that ‘if another flood happens, that’s 
just the way nature is. It is not caused by Fort 
McMurray’ (epicenter of the tar sands). He continues 
by blaming China, saying ‘Fort McMurray, pollution- 
wise puts out, in a year, what China puts out in 23 
hours. They are still building coal fired plants in China, 
they just finished a whole bunch of big coal fired plants 
in Poland, you know? They can’t adapt; they have to 
keep going, people need jobs and they don’t seem to 
understand that here . . . . If they got a problem, they 
got to get China straightened out.’ As Naomi Klein tells 
us, however, ‘This argument is made as if we in the 
West are mere spectators to this reckless and dirty 
model of economic growth. As if it was not our govern-
ments and our multinationals that pushed a model of 
export-led development that made all this possible. It 
is said as if it were not our own corporations who, with 
single-minded determination . . . . turned the Pearl 
River Delta into their carbon-spewing special eco-
nomic zone’ (Klein 2014, p. 82). Rachel likewise believes 
that Albertans are doing all of the emissions cutting 
work, but getting none of the due credit, saying ‘It’s 
bigger than Canada even. Like you can’t have that CO2 
coming out of China while we’re doing all the work.’
A number of other participants discursively shift 
the blame from oil (on which they depend) to coal 
(on which they do not), arguing that coal is the real 
problem. When asked about what approach Alberta 
should take to climate change, Allan immediately 
speaks of coal, saying ‘I mean get off coal is number 
one, right? But then you know there are 500 new 
coal plants coming online in China, so our twenty 
or whatever it is [are inconsequential].’ Then, when 
asked about whether we should continue producing 
oil from the tar sands, he contradicts himself, saying 
‘I don’t think we should continue, but I don’t 
think . . . . I don’t think we could phase it out.’ 
Graham adds ‘The number I heard the other day 
was 50% of Alberta’s electricity was produced from 
coal. So where did that come from? I didn’t think 
they used coal anymore? . . . . Can society do better 
and find other things? Sure. But show me a person 
that doesn’t use anything and that has actually 
reduced their quality of life for saving the planet – 
there are not many of them.’ Tasha feels the same, 
pointing to the environmental devastation in 
Appalachia: ‘They are really after the oil sands, but 
you could go to any country in the world, and even 
the United States and Appalachian Mountains, and 
see what devastation they have done with coal 
mining and that. So it is easy to lay the blame, 
but all of the communities really need to be 
involved in this.’ Though she is not wrong about 
the impact of coal mining, especially mountain-top 
removal methods, her interview, like many of the 
interviews, works to shift the blame from oil and 
onto other types of fossil fuels on which they are 
not economically dependent. Other participants 
shifted blame to clear-cut logging in British 
Columbia (‘BC is certainly not the good guys’ says 
Frank), to celebrities such as Neil Young who visit or 
speak about the tar sands (‘They are hypocrites’ 
says Gary) and to any number of other parties. 
Graham adds that ‘I have never met an environmen-
talist who is truly living a pure life. They are not. 
They do their best, and I think at their worst they 
are radical, but it is not fair to point at government 




Previous research shows that residents of Alberta, like 
many places, maintain great trust in scientists – more 
so than in politicians or the news media (Boulianne 
and Belland 2019). Data from this project demonstrate 
that this was true for some, in particular and very 
nuanced ways, but for a sizable number of participants, 
skepticism prevailed.
On the one hand, many participants implied that 
the science on anthropogenic climate change is yet 
undecided, but that they also trust scientists to figure 
out it. In her interview, Mary-Jean says that climate 
scientists are being muzzled and made to toe the 
party line by government. She says ‘I also think that 
the scientists should be free to express their knowl-
edge and opinions without being shut down by the 
government because people need to know and make 
informed decisions, not just what the government 
thinks we need to hear.’ She states that she believes 
more scientists would dissent if they were not ‘shut 
down’ in doing so. Kristopher similarly adds: ‘Well, you 
know as I said, a vote of scientists is not the same as 
scientific proof,’ meaning that although there may be 
a scientific consensus on the matter, definitive ‘proof’ 
still eludes science.
A number of other participants placed unwavering 
trust in scientists to discover this truth, but stated that 
they believed these scientists would eventually discover 
that climate change is not in fact anthropogenic. When 
asked if there is anything we can do to prevent climate 
change, Gary, who earlier said he believes that climate 
change is mostly or entirely a natural process, adds that 
‘Everybody has got to get on the wagon and start step-
ping up. People know what to do. [Author] knows what 
to do. I know what to do. But they don’t listen to us. You 
know?’ He continues discussing the current project, 
saying ‘Doing study after study is just a waste of time. 
I hope you do something with this . . . . This is the kind of 
study that needs to be done but people have to listen, 
and you have to get all the bullshit paperwork out of it. 
I realize this takes time and you guys are really good at 
doing what you are doing, but I hope our professor can 
take this and actually say “this is what needs to be 
done.” We don’t have to study this for the next 50 
years – we don’t have time.’ Earlier in the interview 
Gary told us, however, that he does not feel climate 
change is driven by carbon emissions or human activity, 
revealing the complicated, nuanced, back-and-forth 
views that many participants maintain related to climate 
science. Participants likewise voiced skepticism about 
the motivations of scientists and researchers, including 
the author of this paper. When asked at the end if he 
had anything to add, he said ‘No, I don’t but I will keep 
an eye on this Tim Haney and if I see his name coming 
up in some radical movement against the oilsands then 
I will call!’
Several other participants worried that scientists 
were using flawed data or flawed studies to mobilize 
opposition to the oil sands, which Graham calls ‘radi-
cal.’ Nancy similarly says she distrusts scientists and 
instead wishes that energy industry lobby groups 
were more vocal about sharing ‘the truth’ with the 
public, as she believes they are being overshadowed 
by scientists with an anti-oil agenda. According to her,
“I think we should stand up for ourselves. I think for 
too long, we’ve been letting the rhetoric, and the 
politics and the scientist actors run the agenda. 
I think we shoulda had organizations like CAPP 
[Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers] and 
other people like that, and citizens’ organizations like 
that have their say. They’re smart people and they’re 
coming out with education now. I think it was too little 
too late, sadly. But do it. Just do it. Organizations like 
that have to come up and just give truth. Give truth. 
Give facts and get out there and do that. I think that’s 
the only option we have. ‘Cause if you heard the truth, 
if you were willing to hear the truth, you would look at 
differently . . . . I think opinions would change if it was 
purely a fact-based thing.”
In this quotation, Nancy refers to an industry lobby 
group as a ‘citizens’ group,’ implying that it is grass-
roots in nature. She says she believes that organiza-
tions like this, if they were more vocal, could ‘give 
truth’ and if people heard that truth they would ‘look 
at it differently.’ She also discusses scientists as ‘scien-
tist actors,’ perhaps meaning to imply ‘activists,’ as 
a critique suggesting a lack of neutrality and objectiv-
ity. Indeed, recent scholarship points out that the per-
ception of scientists as engaging in activism is one of 
the drivers of distrust among right-wing Americans 
(Cofnas, Carl, and Woodley Of Menie 2018). Nancy 
continues, arguing that the scientific consensus on 
warming has changed frequently, and questions the 
very credibility of scientists. Nancy says
“I think the problem is we’ve let it go too long and this 
whole climate change, global warming, oops global 
cooling, oops climate change whatever the hell you 
want it call it now be— you know to make all these 
scientists feel better— and they’re not really scientists. 
What’s happened is people have wrapped their entire 
lives around the you know whatever it is— they’re 
environmentalist— they’re this, they’re that . . . and 
they don’t care about truth anymore. Because if some-
body gets through to them and they realize that 
things may not be as they were told—they lose every-
thing. They lose their credibility, they lose their friends, 
they lose their social structure. They lose everything, 
because so many people have so much tied into their 
worldview now. That I think it’s—I don’t think it can 
change . . . I think it’s a really uphill battle by now. We 
waited too long.”
Nancy gives us an extended look into her view on 
scientists (‘they’re not really scientists’), and implies 
that scientists cannot tell the ‘truth’ because of all 
they have to lose by doing so. She is not alone in 
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these views. When asked about whether we should 
decrease carbon emissions because of the scientific 
consensus on climate change, Scott says ‘it seems like 
you can’t trust people [implying scientists], and I am 
getting more and more pessimistic and skeptical as 
I get older. I take my car in for repairs and, “Am 
I going to get ripped off here?” I know it is Toyota, 
but are they going to rip me off? Yeah, he did! Five 
hundred dollars and he just changed an air cleaner and 
stuff! He ripped me off!’ Scott’s quote implies that 
professionals (whether it be scientists or automotive 
technicians) cannot be fully trusted to perform their 
job duties ethically and in ways that are deserving of 
public trust.
Several participants spoke about the tendency for 
scientists and politicians to be alarmist or to intention-
ally provoke fear in the public, to achieve desired 
economic or social reforms. Jackie says she ‘sometimes 
had trouble knowing what is true and what isn’t true – 
separating fact from fiction – because I think there is 
a lot of fearmongering sometimes.’ She says that this 
‘fearmongering’ is done by politicians and scientists 
with regard to the climate crisis, specifically. Such 
accounts imply that scientists are stoking public fear 
in order to gain something personally, implying at least 
some degree of conspiratorial thinking found in cli-
mate change research from other jurisdictions 
(Sarathchandra and Haltinner 2020; Haltinner and 
Saratchandra 2020).
Lastly, Kristopher tells us that the consensus of 
scientists is not necessarily scientific truth, or even 
what the data really demonstrate. He says
“You know there are a lot of people asking questions 
like you’re asking. With easy answers. Oh yeah. And 
then it goes down as a vote. Science has voted. I talked 
to somebody in Sunnyside who voted that, yes, CO2 is 
cause of climate [change]— I don’t know! So, but for 
me to say yes or no doesn’t matter. I don’t know. It’s 
not at all clear to me—at all— that CO2 is connected to 
—well this obviously it’s correlation. But it’s not clear 
at all that’s causation . . . And the causation has never 
been made— you know there’s— you hear theories 
and you look at the data and you go ‘oh yeah except 
that you know what data doesn’t support theories so 
now what? Now what?’ And then you end up with 
theories that sort of like ‘That doesn’t make sense!’ 
So no.”
For Kristopher, a consensus among scientists is not 
enough to convince him of anthropogenic climate 
change. This statement implies, of course, that scien-
tists are choosing to support (‘vote’ as he says) a causal 
link between human activity and a changing climate, 
even if that’s not what the objective data show. Dave 
similarly tells us that scientists pick arbitrary cut-off 
points in their data, and likely do so in order to bolster 
their arguments. He likens this to public authorities 
creating a limit for blood alcohol levels in impaired 
driving laws;
“Where did that come from? Like is it just pie in the sky, 
that’s enough trouble right? It needs so have some of 
[rationale] behind it, here’s why you know, you know if 
it’s above this or below that then it’s gonna do this 
damage and if it’s above that it’s gonna be really, really 
hard to achieve or whatever. But just to say this is what 
we want right like drinking .08, right? Are you drunk at 
.08? Maybe you might be maybe I won’t [be], right? 
Why did you pick .08? Why didn’t you pick .1 or why 
didn’t you pick .05? (laughing) Just that it’s a good 
number I’ll take it, that’s the trouble we have to have 
something that’s science that says this is where is 
should be. This is where we are going to get the 
most bang for our buck.”
Some participants did voice an unwavering trust in 
scientists, and in turn the consensus on climate 
change, but they were a minority. Pheobe, who has 
a Ph.D. in the natural sciences, tells us ‘The govern-
ment at any level needs to really start to trust what the 
climate scientists are saying, I think, and then make 
decisions based on facts . . . . In this case public opinion 
shouldn’t matter because . . . you can’t have an opinion 
about a fact.’ She later adds, ‘And so I think the govern-
ment decisions should be weighed on facts that are 
presented by experts in their field – people who have 
been doing this their whole entire lives,’ implying 
a high degree of trust in scientists.
Fossil fuel dependence and the consensus on 
climate change
Many of the participants’ positions that contradict 
the scientific consensus on climate change (dis-
cussed in the first section) and much of their distrust 
of scientists (discussed in the second section) ulti-
mately stems, I argue, from a desire to discursively 
protect Alberta’s oil industry, on which many of 
them depend either directly or indirectly. They also 
engage in these discursive strategies when asked 
about how we might ameliorate or mitigate the 
climate crisis, and they do so by suggesting ideas 
and solutions that attribute responsibility elsewhere 
or are slow and incremental in nature. These slow, 
incremental approaches are indeed directly at odds 
with recent warnings from scientists that drastic cuts 
to carbon emissions must occur immediately and 
should have occurred years ago (Ripple et al. 2020). 
Their defensiveness, I argue, taps into the sources of 
scientific distrust and climate change denial dis-
cussed above.
For instance, when asked about the largest or most 
significant action that should be taken to mitigate 
climate change, participants in the study normally 
cited small actions that would have only infinitesimally 
small impacts on Canada’s actual carbon footprint. 
These included: planting trees along riverbanks 
(Nicole), using less water in our households 
(Timothy), capturing CO2 from chimneys and 
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sequestering it (Tasha), fixing oil pipeline leaks (Dave), 
and the ceasing of strip-mining practices (Angelina). 
Though all positive changes, of course, each would 
have a small or negligible impact on Canada’s or on 
Alberta’s actual carbon footprint. Rarely mentioned in 
their interviews, however, is the need to extract, man-
ufacture, ship, consume, and discard fewer products 
derived from the environment, nor using fewer fossil 
fuels to do so.
Through these accounts, participants danced on 
a fine line between voicing a commitment to the 
environment and not stepping on the toes of the oil 
industry, in which many of them worked and on which 
all at least indirectly depended. In doing so, they used 
three main discursive strategies.
First, they pointed to what they saw as the absolute 
necessity and irreplaceability of oil and gas. Caleb 
reveals that his behaviors have not changed since the 
flood, however this is because ‘it is a bit of a trap for all 
of us, there is really not much you can do since we rely 
on our vehicles.’ According to him, because we live in 
cities constructed for transportation mainly by auto-
mobile, the ability to decrease one’s carbon footprint is 
limited. His comment suggests that doing so would be 
a tremendous inconvenience, a sacrifice he is not will-
ing to make.
Along similar lines, Timothy gestured to the inter-
viewer’s sweater, as a way of pointing out the ubiquity 
of oil and gas in our products and lives. He then says, 
‘take everything that has been touched by oil and gas 
out of your life and what do you have? You are living . . . 
under a tree naked, basically. You have no shelter, you 
have no heat in your house sort of things.’ Likewise for 
Gary, it is nearly impossible to discuss the environment 
without the absolutely necessity of oil. When asked 
about the drivers of climate change, he says ‘I think 
the environment is doing what it is naturally doing. 
Would it be a good idea to . . . [pause] . . . I mean we are 
still going to need oil, we still need natural gas, I mean 
you don’t have any even . . . everything is oil.’ Here Gary 
presumably begins to ask himself ‘Would it be good to 
[decrease use of fossil fuels]?’ but stops and redirects 
his answer rather than saying it.
Second, they pointed out that people who work in 
oil and gas are good, well-intentioned people and that 
blaming the industry, which they see many scientists 
and environmentalists doing, is disingenuous. 
Angelina tells us, ‘it is too easy to blame oil and gas 
for climate change. That’s too small a picture I think. 
And it is too easy to be afraid of being blamed and 
therefore say there is no problem ‘cause otherwise . . . 
So we need to get past that. And that’s what we should 
do – twenty years ago already. Again, so that one of 
the key things we need to do as Albertans. We could 
lead the way in getting past that divisive “us and them” 
which will not solve the problems.’ Nancy similarly 
feels that the industry is already doing as much as it 
can, but fails to get the deserved credit; ‘Alberta com-
panies have done a great job adjusting and emitting 
less. I think Alberta is a great example . . . . If you think 
about what we were emitting and what we are doing 
and [what we are doing today] . . . . There’s no compar-
ison. Every single year they do it with less water and 
less steam and less impact and less emissions.’ Even 
Pheobe, who subscribes to the scientific consensus on 
climate change, dislikes the rhetoric of environmental-
ists, and is critical of
“all the negative comments from lots of places about 
all these people [who work] for dirty oil. Like there’s 
some really intelligent, really caring people that work 
for an oil and gas company, and they’re not stupid 
people, they believe in climate change—they just 
happen to work in a job where their skills are very 
useful, and they’re paid very well. But they’re not bad 
people for working at Shell or EnCana, or you know 
a little start-up oil and gas firm. And it’s not that they 
don’t care, it’s just that, that’s their job.”
Later on in our interview, she remarks ‘The oil and gas 
companies and their leadership as you know, people 
who want to rape earth like that’s just – that’s just 
rude . . . . You’re not gonna get the right answer from 
them or the right reaction when you’re basically just 
insulting their intelligence.’ Here she suggests – possi-
bly quite rightly – that insults and accusations will not 
produce the needed reductions in carbon emissions. 
At the same time, a less sanguine view of this argu-
ment is that it serves as an attempt to delay and 
obfuscate meaningful climate action by blunting cri-
tique of the fossil fuel industry and those who work 
within it.
Finally, participants pointed out that the sudden, 
drastic emissions cuts called for by scientists (Ripple 
et al. 2020) are a bad idea and might carry dire eco-
nomic consequences. They generally objected to sud-
den changes to the oil and gas economy on which they 
dependent, preferring small incremental changes. The 
appropriateness of only small, incremental changes to 
fossil fuel use was particularly pronounced when par-
ticipants were asked if we should stop producing oil 
from the tar sands, given the scientific consensus on 
climate change. Matthew says, ‘Stop it all together . . . 
Uhhh at a reasonable pace, I suppose. Yeah ‘cause 
again you don’t want to have a ton of people out of 
work, [and] you don’t want to have everybody hating 
the government that’s trying to do a good job. You 
don’t want everybody having that, that backlash. 
I think there are lot of jobs involved. There’s a lot of 
money involved. A lot of political will involved. And 
you have to kind of do it at the, at a smart rate. At the 
right pace, but yeah eventually.’ Jackie calls these 
‘baby steps’ and feels as though that is all Canada 
needs, unlike India and China which need a massive 
environmental overhaul, according to her. Similarly, 
when Bryan is discussing a carbon tax (which Alberta 
12 T. J. HANEY
had until 2019 and then rescinded) and its effect on 
gasoline prices, he says ‘The cut off could be five cents 
[per liter] more tomorrow, I don’t care. If it’s fifty cents 
more tomorrow, we’ve got a problem. People will 
absorb all kinds of incremental changes. As long as 
they’re incremental.’ Timothy feels similarly about the 
carbon tax, saying ‘You have to be careful with that, 
that is . . . you have to consider the economics with 
that . . . . If you are going to do that, you should be 
taxing the individual as well, because we are the con-
sumers, right? The companies are only providing the 
product for us to consume, and we are creating that 
demand. If you really want to stop climate change you 
tax us, right? Not the companies.’ If you tax them, ‘they 
just move somewhere else if it isn’t economic here . . . 
they move to the [United] States, they move to 
Argentina, they move to Europe, France, whatever. 
They don’t care. It’s global, right? We lose out. We are 
the ones that have no jobs if the companies leave, and 
the government loses too because they don’t have 
that income anymore – the royalties and all that are 
shot down. The companies don’t care, it’s all econom-
ics.’ When asked about increased corporate regulations 
for oil and gas producers, Peter perhaps sums up the 
feelings of participants best when he says, ‘As long as it 
doesn’t cost me anything.’
The reluctance to make environmental or economic 
changes too quickly, too drastically – or in some cases, 
at all – serves to tie together earlier findings about 
both participants’ views on climate change that run 
counter to the consensus, as well as their varying 
degrees and types of trust in science and scientists. In 
short, I argue, the views of most participants in this 
study on climate science ultimately stem from 
a defensiveness of the oil and gas industry, one that 
has been found in other post-disaster work in fossil 
fuel-dependent communities (Bishop 2014; Hamilton, 
Safford, and Ulrich 2012). Ultimately, it reveals an anxi-
ety about participants’ economic well-being, and what 
that might entail in a post-oil Alberta economy. 
Participants therefore work discursively to cast doubt 
both on the empirical reality of climate change (first 
section, above) and upon those undertaking the work 
of climate science (second section). Hence, their defen-
siveness and support for a slow, incremental approach 
to phasing out fossil fuels is likely carefully considered 
and instrumental in nature – not solely a function of 
a lack of education or knowledge. Although it is not 
realistic to expect that individuals would flatly state 
that they do not believe in the consensus, or do not 
trust scientists, specifically because of their depen-
dence on oil (thereby admitting that their beliefs 
about the validity of science stem from their economic 
concerns), this section helps us see some of the ways 
that beliefs about science might flow logically from 
a worldview consumed by the perceived ubiquity and 
necessity of oil.
Conclusion
The findings discussed above reveal how Albertans 
living in the economic hub of Canada’s tar sands feel 
about the scientific consensus on climate change and 
about the attendant work of scientists. Though an 
emerging body of work suggests that flood-affected 
Albertans have shifted their environmental views 
somewhat since the 2013 flood (Haney 2021; Haney 
and McDonald-Harker 2017; McDonald-Harker, Bassi, 
and Haney 2021), prior research had not yet examined 
whether residents in this oil-producing region are 
accepting of the consensus and trusting of scientists 
after going through such an environmental disaster.
I find that even after experiencing an environmental 
disaster, participants did not generally echo a position 
consistent with the scientific consensus on climate 
change. Though a few expressed uncertainty about 
climate change and its key drivers, many more echoed 
positions inconsistent with the scientific consensus on 
climate change, arguing that the climate was not 
indeed occurring, that humans are not responsible 
for change, that oil is not to blame, and that if anyone 
is to blame, it is emerging economies like India and 
China, not Canada.
When discussing the role of scientists, their views 
took two directions. On the one hand, some partici-
pants voiced a faith in scientists to discover the ‘truth,’ 
which they usually implied would someday reveal that 
carbon emissions are not, in fact, driving climate 
change. They told us that if scientists were unmuzzled 
and could speak freely, they would arrive at this con-
clusion. So while they maintained faith in science, they 
did not believe the scientific consensus on climate 
change. In fact, several of the participants told us that 
they distrust scientists who they see as protecting their 
own economic self-interest, as ideological, as ‘fear-
mongers,’ or as simply corrupt. They said that these 
scientists are ‘not real scientists,’ they are instead acti-
vists, and that they ‘do not care about truth anymore.’
Lastly, participants were very careful to suggest 
solutions to the climate crisis (which they did not con-
sider to be a crisis) that were small, incremental, and 
non-threatening to the economic and cultural hege-
mony of oil in Alberta. They worried that large policy 
shifts, away from fossil fuels, would mean job losses 
and economic disruption. To this end, they did not 
favor action commensurate with the challenges that 
the climate crisis confronts us with, nor the immediacy 
that scientists instruct us is required to address it.
Although some research flowing out of the 
Southern Alberta Flood sensitizes us to the changes 
in environmental views that took place for some resi-
dents (Haney and McDonald-Harker 2017; McDonald- 
Harker, Bassi, and Haney 2021), the findings of this 
article are more consistent with the theoretical frame-
work and empirical findings of Bishop (2014) and 
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Hamilton, Safford, and Ulrich (2012) who contend that 
post-disaster environmental views are shaped by eco-
nomic interests and dependence on fossil fuels. Bishop 
dubs these events ‘focusing events,’ as they reveal to 
residents that their preferred industry might come 
under attack as affected communities demand change 
(for instance, cuts in fossil fuel extraction and emis-
sions). As a result, they rally around the industry to 
protect it. This strategy was evident in the interviews 
discussed herein, as participants generally defended 
the ubiquity and necessity of oil and gas by denying 
anthropogenic climate changing, blaming other dri-
vers of climate change, or expressing mistrust in cli-
mate scientists. In doing so, they engage in discursive 
work to protect Canada’s tar sands and what they view 
as their economic livelihoods.
A body of work on climate change denial helps us 
understand who believes the scientific consensus on 
climate change, and who does not, demographically 
speaking (Hamilton, Hartter, and Bell 2019; McCright 
and Dunlap 2011b, McCright and Dunlap 2011a; 
Smiley 2017). However, the present analysis sensitizes 
us to the ways in which denial or acceptance are not 
black-and-white matters, just as trust in scientists is 
not so discrete. Instead, this analysis shows us that 
while many people in this oil-dependent region do 
indeed doubt or reject the scientific consensus on 
climate change (as we might have expected), many 
nevertheless trust scientists to one day figure out the 
‘truth.’ Similar to Mann and Schleifer (2020)’s work, 
many participants trusted science but distrusted the 
scientists themselves, however, the emergent story is 
even more complicated than that. This analysis adds 
a layer of complexity by showing how many residents 
actually trusted the scientists, but trusted them to 
eventually discover that climate change was indeed 
not occurring or not anthropogenic in nature, viewing 
scientific data as currently inconclusive. Many others 
accept parts of the scientific consensus; for instance, 
they believe that the earth’s climate is changing, but 
that volcanic activity, sunspots, or other drivers are 
responsible – rarely mentioning our use of oil as 
a causal factor. To explore these nuanced views 
further, the final section of the analysis looked at 
what exactly participants thought should be done 
about climate change – to the extent that they felt 
anything should be done at all. In these cases, parti-
cipants favored small, ‘baby steps’ approaches to 
eventually, one day, decreasing oil use. Despite the 
need to shift away from oil, and the immediate need 
for action given the current climate crisis, being 
widely accepted among scientists, participants from 
Calgary did not see it the same way. This work speaks 
to literature in environmental sociology looking at 
dichotomies of trust/mistrust in science, and belief/ 
denial of anthropogenic climate change. The partici-
pants frequently echoed the talking points provided 
by right-wing, industry-supported think tanks like 
‘Friends of Science,’ suggesting that the discourse 
and rhetoric coming from such organizations (not to 
mention government and the private sector who also 
advance pro-oil messaging) have an impact and have 
made the beliefs of Calgarians more durable, even in 
the aftermath of environmental disaster.
Of course, we must remember that a sample of 40 
participants from one city cannot be understood as 
representative of that entire city, nor should the find-
ings be generalized to the larger provincial or national 
population. Still, the value of such a sample rests in its 
ability to provide deep understanding of how partici-
pants view a particular issue, uncovering key themes 
and mechanisms at play. Larger surveys of residents in 
fossil fuel-dependent communities should be under-
taken, although as I find in this study, dichotomous 
measurers of trust/distrust in scientists may miss 
important nuance – for instance, that participants 
trust scientists to one day discern that climate change 
is not caused by humans. Though this constitutes 
a form of trust, to be sure, it is not the type of trust in 
climate scientists normally operationalized and 
included on survey instruments.
It is clear that values, economic dependence on 
fossil fuels, and even recent disaster experience con-
tribute to people’s understandings of what is scientifi-
cally ‘true.’ As Hoffman (2018) argues, science and 
technology studies must continue to play an important 
role in this particular moment he says is defined by 
‘post-truth demagoguery.’ Though it is tempting to 
argue that better public education is needed on the 
connection between fossil fuels and a changing cli-
mate, much existing work demonstrates that wealthy 
residents of the Global North are already aware of 
these facts (Norgaard 2011). But coming to terms 
with the empirical reality evokes deep emotions – 
fear, helplessness, guilt, and so on. For Albertans stu-
died in this paper, the fear of job loss and economic 
insecurity seem prevalent. Hence, instead of simply 
arguing for more and better education, scholarly 
work and policy interventions should focus on quelling 
these concerns and offering residents in fossil fuel- 
dependent places viable economic alternatives that 
will allow them to find employment in greener indus-
tries. We may very well find that this action alone will 
increase public uptake of science, trust in climate 
scientists, and adherence to the scientific consensus 
on climate change.
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